On this page · 10 sections
  1. The weight of debt, not its amount
  2. France: three decades, and three years that stand out
  3. Elsewhere, how do declines in the ratio break down?
  4. What primary balance would stabilise the debt?
  5. Is French public debt sustainable?
  6. In the European windows selected, has a high debt ratio fallen sharply with a negative average primary balance?
  7. What these data do not say
  8. What to take away
  9. Frequently asked questions
  10. Where these figures come from

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Data last updated 2 November 2026 General government, Eurostat series from 1996 to 2025. Download: CSV · JSON · method

The weight of debt, not its amount

The debt ratio sets what general government owes against the wealth produced in a year, gross domestic product (GDP), measured in current euros, known as nominal GDP. It falls as soon as nominal GDP grows faster than the debt: in Portugal, from end-2015 to end-2025, public debt went from 235 to 275 billion euros while its weight fell from 131.0% to 89.2% of GDP. That fall followed an assistance and adjustment programme whose cost to the Portuguese these series do not measure (limits).

Every year, three terms move this ratio, set out in Why does French public debt rise?:

  • interest and growth: the interest paid pushes the ratio up, nominal GDP growth, in volume and in prices, pulls it down; the page calls the net result “the interest-growth effect”;
  • the primary balance, revenue minus spending excluding interest: a deficit pushes the ratio up, a surplus pulls it down;
  • other adjustments, known as “stock-flow”: net acquisitions of financial assets (loans, equity, cash), valuation effects and other differences that change the debt without going through the deficit.

Changes in the ratio are measured in points of GDP. In 2025, one point is about 30 billion euros; but contributions cumulated over ten years, each computed on that year’s GDP, do not represent sums paid or saved. This decomposition is an accounting one: it says through which channel the ratio moved. Economic conditions (growth, inflation, interest rates) and budget decisions act on several terms at once, and it does not separate them.

France: three decades, and three years that stand out

For each of the last three decades, four bars: the interest-growth effect, the primary balance, other adjustments, and the change in the debt ratio, their sum. Over the last decade, interest and growth pull the ratio down, primary deficits push it up by more.
What pushed the French debt-to-GDP ratio up or down, by decade, in points of GDP cumulated (Eurostat, author’s calculation). Orange: what pushes it up; grey: what pulls it down; blue: the change, the sum of the three.

The finding in one sentence. From 2016 to 2025, primary deficits added 30.6 points to the French debt ratio, the interest-growth effect, concentrated in 2021-2023, took off 15.0, and other adjustments added 3.1: the net result is a rise of 18.7 points. This is an accounting decomposition: it says through which term the ratio moved, not why the deficits existed.

The two previous decades. From end-1995 to end-2015, the ratio goes from 57.8% to 97.0% of GDP: the interest-growth effect first pushes the ratio up, with the budget excluding interest close to balance, then primary deficits take over, with the 2008-2009 financial crisis.

The two previous decades, term by term

1996-2005: interest and growth push upwards. The ratio goes from 57.8% of GDP at end-1995 to 68.2% at end-2005. The interest-growth effect adds 8.4 points; the primary balance, in surplus four years out of ten, takes off 2.5, and other adjustments add 4.4.

2006-2015: both terms push together. The ratio gains 28.8 points, the largest rise of the three decades: 22.4 from primary deficits, 7.8 from the interest-growth effect, and other adjustments take off 1.5. The period contains the 2008-2009 financial crisis.

From one decade to the next, the contribution of primary deficits went from −2.5 to +22.4 then +30.6 points. This finding describes a recurrence; it does not say whether these deficits were avoidable, nor which of their two terms, spending or revenue, explains them.

2016-2025: three years of relief, outweighed by deficits. Over the decade, interest adds 17.7 points to the ratio and nominal GDP growth erases 32.7: the interest-growth effect is −15.0 points. This is not a steady advantage. The years 2021-2023 alone take off 16.8 points; the other seven together weigh +1.8 points, including +6.1 in 2020, when GDP fell. In 2021, activity rebounds (6.9% in volume); in the next two years, nominal growth owes more to prices than to volume. Even when rising prices lighten the ratio, this is not an equivalent gain in wealth: inflation higher than expected reduces the real value of fixed payments owed to creditors, a redistributive effect that depends on the indexation of the securities and their maturity. No year of the decade shows a primary surplus: cumulated deficits add 30.6 points, more than the whole rise in the ratio (+18.7).

Elsewhere, how do declines in the ratio break down?

The same decomposition, over the same decade, applies to the EU countries whose debt exceeded 90% of GDP at end-2015: France, at 97.0%, and six others, all starting from a higher level. This threshold is a presentation convention, close to the French level; it does not make these countries equivalent experiences, and, at 100%, France drops out of the group.

For each country in the group, four bars: the interest-growth effect, the primary balance, other adjustments, and the change in the debt ratio, their sum. The interest-growth effect pulls the ratio down everywhere; in the three countries where the ratio fell markedly, it weighs about twice as much as primary surpluses.
Interest-growth effect, primary balance and other adjustments, and their sum, the change in the debt ratio, 2016-2025, in points of GDP cumulated (Eurostat, author’s calculation). Countries sorted by change in the ratio.

Two drivers, in order of weight. In the three countries where the ratio fell markedly, Cyprus, Portugal and Greece, the largest accounting contribution comes from interest and growth: 31.2 to 49.4 points over ten years, about twice that of their primary surpluses, 15.3 to 23.1 points (a ratio of 2.0 to 2.2). Both contributions depend on economic conditions, and neither allows the fall to be attributed to a particular policy.

What is established. These three falls coincided with an average primary surplus, of 1.5% to 2.3% of GDP, and the interest-growth effect weighed more in them than the surplus.

What is not. That the surpluses caused these falls, or that they were indispensable. Leaving the surpluses aside, the other terms together already pull the ratio down, by 19.0 to 36.2 points depending on the country. This does not mean the ratio would have fallen without a surplus, because the terms are not independent: a surplus can slow activity, strong growth swells revenue. But the decomposition cannot, on its own, make the surplus a necessary condition. Slovenia gives an example: starting from debt of 83.4% of GDP, below the 90% threshold used here, it saw its ratio fall by 18.3 points with an average primary balance of −0.5% of GDP.

Their implicit interest rate was not lower. Over the decade, the average implicit interest rate on their debt, interest paid relative to debt, ranges from 1.76% to 2.40%, against 1.74% in France, the lowest in the group. This indicator concerns the stock: it reflects the history of issuance, its maturity and official loans, and does not say on what terms these countries borrowed on the markets. Their nominal GDP growth, on the other hand, was stronger: 3.8% to 8.0% a year on average, against 3.2% in France. In volume, it exceeded that of France, at 1.7% to 5.9% a year against 1.3%; price growth was 2.0% to 3.3% a year, against 1.9%.

The level of debt matters too. The same gap between interest rate and growth takes off more points the higher the ratio. Greece’s implicit interest rate is roughly the same as France’s (1.76% against 1.74%), and its nominal growth barely exceeds France’s (3.8% against 3.2%): its gap between rate and growth is hardly more favourable (−2.0 points a year, against −1.4). But its debt, 182% of GDP on average, the highest in the group, multiplies that gap: the interest-growth effect reaches −31.2 points there, against −15.0 in France. Part of Greek debt has been owed to its European partners since the assistance programmes; these series do not separate the rate on those loans from that on the rest of the debt. The higher the starting debt, the more a given gap between interest rate and growth amplifies the change in the ratio, downwards as well as upwards.

The other countries in the group. In France, the ratio rose by 18.7 points, the largest rise in the group, with the highest average primary deficit (−3.1% of GDP); the ratio ended the decade roughly where it started for Spain, Italy and Belgium, with an average primary deficit, despite a favourable interest-growth effect. Portugal, Cyprus and Greece received official financing from their European partners and the IMF, Spain assistance to recapitalise its banks (timeline in the folded section below). Seven countries over one decade do not make a general regularity.

The seven countries, term by term, rate by rate, and the assistance programmes
CountryDebt, end-2015Debt, end-2025ChangeInterest and growthof which interestof which growthPrimary balanceOther adjustmentsAverage primary balance
Cyprus111.652.3−59.3−49.4+18.1−67.5−23.1+13.3+2.3%
Portugal131.089.2−41.9−33.8+27.2−61.0−15.6+7.5+1.6%
Greece179.6145.4−34.3−31.2+30.6−61.8−15.3+12.2+1.5%
Spain102.5100.5−2.0−22.7+23.9−46.5+19.1+1.5−1.9%
Italy135.0136.7+1.7−5.9+36.9−42.8+11.7−4.0−1.2%
Belgium105.7108.1+2.4−23.6+21.0−44.6+17.0+9.0−1.7%
France97.0115.7+18.7−15.0+17.7−32.7+30.6+3.1−3.1%

Debt in % of GDP; change and contributions in points of GDP cumulated over 2016-2025, contributions to the change in the ratio, not amounts paid; under “primary balance”, a negative figure means surpluses. Source: Eurostat.

CountryAverage debtImplicit interest rateNominal growthof which volumeof which pricesRate minus growth
Cyprus932.078.05.92.0−5.9
Portugal1182.405.72.33.3−3.3
Greece1821.763.81.72.0−2.0
Spain1052.384.72.12.5−2.3
Italy1382.773.31.32.0−0.5
Belgium1042.104.51.62.8−2.4
France1051.743.21.31.9−1.4

Annual averages over 2016-2025: debt in % of GDP at the start of each year; rates and growth in % a year. Volume: chain-linked national-accounts volumes; prices: (1 + nominal growth) / (1 + volume growth) − 1, year by year; the two averages do not add up exactly. Source: Eurostat.

The ratio ended the decade roughly where it started for Spain, Italy and Belgium (−2.0 to +2.4 points), with an average primary deficit, despite a favourable interest-growth effect. In Belgium, the contributions of interest-growth and of the primary balance total −6.6 points; other adjustments add 9.0, bringing the change to +2.4 points.

These countries were not financed on the same terms. Portugal (from 2011 to mid-2014), Cyprus (from April 2013 to March 2016) and Greece (from May 2010 to August 2018, with a last programme, financed by the European Stability Mechanism, from August 2015 to August 2018) received official financing from their European partners and the IMF; Spain received, from July 2012 to January 2014, assistance to recapitalise its banks (European Commission; European Stability Mechanism). The restructuring of Greek debt, in 2012, predates the decade studied.

Lowering the threshold to 80% brings Austria, Croatia and Slovenia into the group.

What primary balance would stabilise the debt?

Two primary balances and one effort should be kept apart: the observed primary balance, the one recorded in the accounts; the stabilising primary balance, the one that would have left the ratio unchanged in the year, stock-flow adjustments aside; and the medium-term effort, which this page does not calculate: the multi-year adjustment that institutions estimate, under their assumptions, to reach a deficit or debt target.

In a given year, and excluding other adjustments, the ratio does not move if the primary balance exactly offsets that year’s interest-growth effect. This balance, called stabilising, is the grey line; the balance actually observed is the orange line.

Two annual lines over thirty years, as a percentage of GDP: the observed primary balance and the balance that would have stabilised the debt ratio, which jumps in the year GDP fell and plunges in the year of the rebound; in the last year, a dotted line marks the gap between the two.
Observed primary balance and the primary balance that would have stabilised the debt ratio within the year, excluding other adjustments, France, in % of GDP (Eurostat, author’s calculation).

Why the marker changes from year to year. It depends on the gap between the implicit interest rate and nominal growth, multiplied by the level of debt. In 2020, nominal GDP fell: stabilising the ratio would have taken a primary balance of +6.1% of GDP, a surplus. In 2021, it rebounded: a balance of −7.3%, hence a deficit, would have kept it stable. These swings do not measure a change in budget discipline: growth is what moved.

In 2025. The implicit interest rate (2.0%) and nominal growth (1.9%) were almost equal: the marker was close to zero. The observed balance was −2.9% of GDP, a gap of 3.0 points, about 89 billion euros relative to 2025 GDP (2,991 billion), computed on the gap before rounding. It is an accounting gap observed for that year, at that year’s interest rates and growth and excluding other adjustments: it changes every year with them, and it says neither which spending nor which revenue should move. It would also narrow through growth: at this level of debt, and with the interest rate unchanged, each additional point of nominal growth would lower the balance that stabilises the ratio by about 1.1 points. This is a property of the identity, for a given debt and interest rate; it does not say that a point of growth is as easy to obtain, or as cheap, as a budget adjustment.

The marker, year by year, and French surpluses

Over 30 years, the observed balance reached or exceeded this marker in eleven years. The ratio actually fell in nine of those years; in 1998 and 2007, it rose all the same, because of other adjustments. Over the same period, France ran a primary surplus only four times, from 1998 to 2001, at most 1.65% of GDP.

Stabilising the ratio and bringing it down are two distinct objectives. An adjustment amount is read with its objective, its horizon and its assumptions; the marker calculated here for 2025 holds for that year and does not allow the multi-year estimates of institutions to be assessed.

In the euro area, how does France’s decomposition compare with the other countries’?

The same calculation, run on the current members of the euro area, separates what the gap to the marker, on its own, conflates: the rate paid on debt, the growth of the economy and the primary balance. Over 2016-2025, all 21 countries are compared; none is set aside by the check: every year of every country matches the ratios published by Eurostat within the rounding margin.

Three rows of dots, one per quantity, averaged over the last ten years: one dot per euro-area country, France in orange, the median marked by a line. Implicit interest rate on debt: France among the lowest. Nominal GDP growth: France among the weakest. Primary balance: France the lowest.
Implicit interest rate, nominal growth and primary balance, annual averages 2016-2025, euro-area countries (Eurostat, author’s calculation).

Among the lowest implicit interest rates. On average over 2016-2025, French general government paid interest equal to 1.74% of its debt, against a median of 2.10%; only five of the countries compared had a lower implicit rate. This rate relates interest to the whole debt, issued over the years: it measures what the stock costs, not the rate at which the State borrows today.

Among the weakest nominal growth. French nominal GDP grew by 3.2% a year, against a median of 5.7%: the second weakest of the countries compared, after that of Finland. The primary balance that would have stabilised the ratio, excluding other adjustments, averaged −1.5% of GDP, close to the median (−1.8%): it depends at once on the implicit rate, on nominal growth and on the level of debt.

The lowest primary balance. The French primary balance averaged −3.1% of GDP, against a median of −0.8%: no other country compared had so low an average primary balance over the period. This ranking therefore covers all current members of the euro area.

What is established. Over 2016-2025, what sets France apart in the euro area is neither the rate paid on its debt, among the lowest, nor the balance that would stabilise it, close to the median: it is its primary balance, the lowest of the countries compared, together with nominal growth among the weakest.

What is not. Whether the gap comes from spending rather than revenue, or the reverse: the primary balance does not separate them. Nor which adjustment would be desirable, nor whether it would have changed the rates paid.

With the Commission’s structural indicator, the ranking is the same. France’s structural primary balance, which the European Commission computes net of estimated cyclical effects and of one-off measures, is also the lowest of the countries compared over the same period: −2.4% of potential GDP on average, against a median of −0.8% (AMECO database, spring 2026 edition). This check plays no part in the calculation, without being fully independent of it: the Commission starts from the same public accounts, and its adjustment rests on an estimate of potential GDP that it revises from one edition to the next. The OECD, which makes its own estimate of potential output, also gives France the lowest structural balance of the countries it covers over the period; the IMF, whose indicator adjusts for the cycle without removing one-off measures, places it level with Finland and Slovakia. The structural ranking therefore depends on the estimate used; the ranking of the observed balance does not.

The gap closed because the marker fell further than the balance. Over the last five years (2021-2025), the marker of every country except Ireland came down compared with the five years before 2020, with strong nominal growth (the recovery after 2020, then rising prices) and, at the median, a lower implicit interest rate: France is no longer, on average, below its own (+0.1 points), and five countries have a less favourable gap. Its primary balance nonetheless remains the lowest of the countries compared, and its structural balance among the two lowest. Over the five years before 2020, France was the only euro-area country whose average primary balance stayed below the marker.

France in the euro area depending on the period chosen, and what the average gap does not add
PeriodCountries comparedPrimary balance (rank from lowest)Stabilising balanceGap to the marker (rank from lowest)Structural balance, AMECO (rank from lowest)
2016-202521−3.1 (1)−1.5−1.6 (1)−2.4 (1)
2021-202521−3.6 (1)−3.7+0.1 (6)−3.2 (2)
202521−2.9 (3 to 4)+0.1−3.0 (1)−2.5 (4)
2015-201921−1.3 (1)−0.5−0.8 (1)−1.1 (1)
2010-201921−2.1 (3)0.0−2.2 (3 to 4)−1.5 (1)

Annual averages, in % of GDP (of potential GDP for the structural balance); ranks read at the displayed precision; when several countries are displayed as equal, the rank gives the places they share. Over 2016-2025 without the year 2020, France keeps the lowest primary and structural balances, and the second weakest nominal growth, after that of Finland.

What the average gap does not add. Over a period, the average gap between the observed balance and the marker equals, up to its sign and by construction, the rise in the ratio excluding other adjustments, divided by the number of years: it restates the change in debt, it does not confirm it. What cannot be deduced from it is the share due to interest rates and growth, the marker, and the share due to the primary balance: this is why the figure shows these quantities rather than the gap.

The euro area is taken in its composition at 1 January 2026: Croatia joined in 2023, Bulgaria in 2026. The ranking for the last year alone depends on its economic conditions, hence the averages over several years.

Is French public debt sustainable?

No level of debt, on its own, settles this question. A debt is called sustainable when the State can service and refinance it without a budgetary adjustment beyond reach; that depends on its primary balance, on the gap between the interest rate it pays and nominal growth, and on the confidence of those who lend to it. The first two terms are measured here; the third is not.

What makes it fragile. The near-equality between interest and growth in 2025 is not a settled state. Over 30 years, the implicit interest rate exceeded nominal growth in 16 of them. Down to 1.2% in 2020, it is rising as old debt is refinanced on market terms, while nominal growth falls back after the inflation years: the relief of the last decade came mostly from 2021-2023. At 2025 levels of debt and growth (115.7% of GDP), and all else equal, one additional point of gap between the interest rate and growth raises the stabilising balance by about 1.1 points of GDP: the higher the debt, the more its path depends on interest rates the budget does not directly control, and whose gap to growth several, though not all, of the studies cited below find higher when debt is higher too.

What these data do not say. Lenders’ confidence, market access and the cost of future refinancing depend on the maturity of the debt and on the gap between market rates and the implicit rate (see transmission), on who holds it (Who really pays for public debt?) and on central bank decisions. The sustainability assessments that institutions publish rest on conditional projections, which these data can neither confirm nor rule out.

In the European windows selected, has a high debt ratio fallen sharply with a negative average primary balance?

The finding in one sentence. No, in the windows selected: among the 78 ten-year windows where starting debt exceeded 90% of GDP, in the 27 current EU members, since 1996, none of the 35 with a negative average primary balance saw the ratio fall by 15 points or more. These windows overlap, come from a few countries and describe past periods, and other windows are excluded, with the reason for each, in the method below: they give neither a surplus threshold to reach nor a probability of success.

Primary balances and falls in the ratio: European ten-year periods

The comparison above covers a single decade. To place it in a wider set, the same decomposition was applied to every ten-year window of the 27 current EU members, since 1996: 537 windows retained (18 excluded, see the method), which overlap, are therefore not as many independent experiments, and include the decade already compared. This is context, not a counter-test.

Among the 78 windows where starting debt exceeded 90% of GDP:

  • negative average primary balance: 35 windows, in six countries (Belgium, Greece, Spain, France, Italy and Portugal). The ratio falls in six of them, never by 15 points;
  • average primary balance from 0 to under 2% of GDP: 30 windows, in five countries. The ratio falls in ten of them, by 15 points or more in eight;
  • average primary balance of at least 2% of GDP: thirteen windows, in only three countries (Belgium, Cyprus and Italy). The ratio falls in all thirteen, by 15 points or more in seven.

These frequencies describe past periods, in a few countries. They give neither a surplus threshold to reach nor a probability of success: the high-surplus windows mostly start before 2003.

What these data do not say

  • Measuring debt. A fall in the ratio does not mean the amount of debt has decreased. The debt tracked is gross: other adjustments mix asset purchases, loans and valuation changes, and a country that borrows to acquire assets sees its gross debt rise without its financial position deteriorating by as much.
  • Economic interpretation. An accounting decomposition, not a causal one: the terms depend on one another, and the observed balance contains the economic cycle; it does not measure an effort. The growth used is nominal; splitting it into volume and prices is an accounting step that does not identify the separate contribution of each. Nothing here says which of spending or revenue should move.
  • Cost of adjustment. These series measure neither unemployment, nor wages, nor public services, nor the consequences of the adjustment programmes followed by Greece, Portugal or Cyprus: a large fall in the ratio is not, in itself, an economic and social success. Who bears an adjustment is the subject of Who really pays for public debt?
  • Scope of comparison. The 27 current EU members, since 1996; nothing before, nothing outside the Union. The group compared depends on the debt threshold and the decade chosen. Five country-years out of 803 are excluded: Eurostat publishes no ratio for them, which the check described below requires.
  • Reach in time. The page describes thirty observed years. The paths forecast by the Government, the European Commission or the IMF are conditional scenarios, which these data can neither confirm nor rule out.
Tested against the research literature: the stabilising balance, the distinction between stabilising and reducing and the role of the primary balance in the gaps between euro-area countries are found again; reading the last year’s zero gap as a lasting state, or the surplus as the only driver of falls, is challenged

Measured here. The decade-by-decade decomposition of the French ratio, the stabilising balance year by year, the comparison of EU countries whose debt exceeded 90% of GDP and that of euro-area members over five periods, which separates implicit rate, nominal growth, marker and primary balance, on Eurostat series, checked against the European Commission’s structural primary balance, and against those of the OECD and the IMF for the structural ranking. None of the texts read calculates these quantities on this source and these periods: they are validated by reproduction. The finding on the primary balance, however, is not new (below).

Consistent with. The primary balance that stabilises the debt depends on the gap between interest and growth and on the level of the debt, in the same identity of debt dynamics, written in nominal terms here and in real terms in the Focus, in Clavères (French Treasury), in note no. 82 of the Conseil d’analyse économique (Auclert, Philippon and Ragot) and in its Focus no. 124 (Auclert, Barbara, Jaravel, Laveissière, Lasterra, Lopes, Ragot and Renaud), which starts from a zero gap, like the page’s benchmark for the last year. The note draws the same distinction between stabilising, which requires a zero primary balance when interest and growth are equal, and reducing, which requires a surplus. Across the G7 countries since the late nineteenth century, Clavères finds that, in the great majority of cases, successful fiscal consolidations rested both on a negative interest-growth gap and on primary surpluses. The French Treasury presents stabilising the ratio as a necessary condition of sustainability, which it also links to the State’s capacity to finance its debt durably; it puts the stabilising balance for 2025 at −2.1% of GDP, as a total public balance, against a deficit of 5.1%. Two different conventions, and an almost identical gap in 2025: about three points of GDP from the Treasury’s figures, 3.0 points measured here as a primary balance. The French Court of Audit (Cour des comptes) makes the same calculation for 2025, on INSEE’s accounts, and finds, after rounding, the same values as the page: a debt-stabilising primary balance of +0.1% of GDP, an observed balance of −2.9%, a gap of 3.0 points (June 2026, table no. 8). Over the long run, it attributes 57.4 points of the rise in the ratio from 1978 to 2024 to primary deficits, and 8.8 points to the “snowball” effect of interest rates and growth (June 2025, pp. 93-94). In its working paper no. 13 (July 2025), the OFCE puts at 2.1 points, in 2024, the gap between the primary balance and the one that would stabilise the debt; the page’s Eurostat measure gives 2.0 points for 2024. For the four largest euro-area countries, from 1995 to 2024, the Cour des comptes (France’s court of audit) makes the finding that the euro-area section extends to 21 countries: the change in the primary balance is “the main explanatory factor” (our translation) of the differences in debt paths, France having run a primary deficit since 2002. The page separates what the Cour combines in the “snowball effect”, the interest rate and growth, and does not take up its reading, which sees in it the effect of a public-finance strategy: the accounting identity does not settle the causes.

Challenged by. Three readings the page must avoid. The first would make the primary surplus the only driver of falls: after 1945, it was the strongly negative gap between interest and growth that contributed most to the fall in advanced economies’ debt, primary surpluses also playing a part (Clavères); in Portugal, the surplus coincided with growth of 4.38% a year from 2015 to 2019, and in Italy, when the interest rate exceeded growth, debt rose despite a positive structural primary balance (CAE note). Hence the page’s caveat: the comparison does not isolate the effect of a policy.

The second would read the last year’s zero gap as a lasting state: in autumn 2025, the State was borrowing at 10 years at 3.5%, above an effective interest rate estimated at 2.0% (CAE Focus); rate rises pass through to the stock only gradually, the average maturity of the debt being 8.5 years in 2023, future values of the gap cannot be forecast, and, in Clavères’s estimate over 18 advanced economies from 1950 to 2019, measured with the 10-year rate, higher debt goes with a higher gap the following year, an effect the author reports as significant in all his specifications; it is his estimate of the probability of a negative gap that he says should be taken with caution.

Three IMF economists (Lian, Presbitero and Wiriadinata), who measure the gap with a long-term market rate, most often the 10-year government bond yield, rather than with this page’s implicit interest rate, find an association in the same direction, which they study in other forms. In 17 advanced economies, France among them, from 1950 to 2019, negative-gap episodes lasting at least three years are shorter the higher the initial debt, by almost five months per ten points of debt, and the probability that a negative gap lasting at least two years gives way to a positive average gap over the next five years rises from about 25% when debt is below the median to almost 75% in the most indebted quarter. In 31 advanced and 25 emerging economies from 2000 to 2019, as debt rises from 40% to 120% of GDP, the 90th percentile of the average gap over the next five years goes from about 0 to about 2 points, while its median rises by about 0.8 points and its 10th percentile by about 1.2 points: the whole distribution shifts upwards, and its upper part shifts the most. These are associations. A further analysis by the authors shows that the currency of issue matters: when debt is split by currency, the gap follows, within each country, foreign-currency debt, whereas its association with domestic-currency debt is not statistically significant there; and countries with debt above the median whose foreign-currency share is below the median keep, on average, a low and negative gap. These results do not carry over mechanically to euro area states, which the paper does not treat separately: their debt is issued in the common currency, but none of them holds on its own the monetary power of the European Central Bank.

On the euro area itself, two published studies diverge. Two ECB economists, from the institution that conducts this monetary policy (Checherita-Westphal and Domingues Semeano), measure the gap with the implicit interest rate, as this page does, in the first twelve members of the euro area, France among them, from 1985 to 2017: ten more points of debt go with a gap higher by 0.4 to 0.6 points, with no apparent threshold, and the authors write that their analysis mostly uncovers correlations, causation probably running both ways. Philipp Heimberger, of the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, does not find this association in 22 OECD countries, 11 of them in the euro area, from 1970 to 2018: the previous year’s debt does not predict a less favourable gap there, inside or outside the euro area, and the length of negative-gap episodes does not depend on initial debt; it is the euro crisis, from 2008 to 2012, that goes with a higher gap, in the periphery countries only, and all the more so as their bonds had previously been seen as less safe. The two studies do not measure the same thing. The second sets the 10-year rate against GDP growth in current dollars, not in euros: for France, 5.2% in 2016 in its data, 1.4% in euros according to Eurostat. It also estimates the association of debt with the gap for given real long-term rates and inflation, whereas part of the effect sought would run precisely through rates.

The Court of Audit deems “retrospectively imprudent” (our translation) the emphasis placed, during the period of low rates, on an interest rate lastingly below growth (June 2025, p. 91), and puts at about 1.1 points of GDP the lasting primary surplus that would stabilise the debt for an interest-growth gap of 1.1 points in the long run, an assumption it takes from the Government’s documents (p. 123). The French Treasury also writes that rising rates reverse the period of negative gap and now require a slight primary surplus, and that rate rises pass through to the stock as it is refinanced. The diagnosis is not unanimous: the OFCE regards a rise in the interest bill as likely, but its size as less certain than in official projections. Refinancing at the July 2025 10-year rate the 900 billion euros of bonds maturing by 2029 would cost about 0.5 points of GDP; the authors set this against a total rise of 1.2 points projected by the IMF, though the two calculations do not cover the same scope. Its model also assumes an effective interest rate below nominal growth from 2026.

Finally, the CAE note argues that it would be hard to let debt exceed 125% of GDP without risking a sharp rise in interest rates, and the Focus uses 130% as the ceiling of its model, Greece’s level in 2009: the first figure is motivated by the observation of a few European cases, the second is a chosen parameter; neither is an estimated threshold, which leaves intact the page’s statement that no level of debt, on its own, settles the question.

The third would infer from the lowest primary balance of the countries compared that France “spends too much” or “does not levy enough”. In François Ecalle’s comparison (Fipeco, April 2026), its public spending and revenue are both the second highest in the euro area in 2025, at 57.2% and 52.1% of GDP; from 2019 to 2025, its revenue fell by 0.9 points while those of the euro area as a whole rose by 0.4 points, and its spending rose by 1.9 points, against 2.8 in the area. The primary balance does not say which of the two halves would need correcting.

Not established. The size of the effort. The CAE Focus’s 112 billion euros amount to 3.7 points of GDP: an estimated structural primary deficit of 2.7 points, as forecast in October 2025, plus one point of margin for the next crisis. They cannot be compared term by term with the page’s observed gap for 2025, excluding other adjustments. The OFCE (Heyer, Plane, Ragot, Sampognaro and Timbeau) puts at 2.8 points of GDP by 2029 a gradual adjustment that would stabilise debt at 110%, 2.5 points with lower interest rates: a model projection. The effect of debt on the future gap: the studies read do not yield a single coefficient, their result depends on how the rate is measured, on the period, on what they hold constant and on monetary institutions; only the accounting relation depends on no estimate: the balance that stabilises debt is the product of the gap and the level of debt, so the higher the debt, the more costly a given rise in the gap, as Heimberger’s article itself points out. Market access: the French Court of Audit tracks its indicators (the yield spread with Germany, auction cover, ratings) and describes a debt that finds buyers without difficulty but at an ever higher rate (our translation), without measuring the effect of the level of debt on that access; the French Treasury invokes credibility with investors without measuring it.

References read

  • Auclert, A., Philippon, T. and Ragot, X., “Quelle trajectoire pour les finances publiques françaises ?” [What path for French public finances?], Les notes du Conseil d’analyse économique, no. 82, July 2024 (in French).
  • Auclert, A., Barbara, M.-A., Jaravel, X., Laveissière, E., Lasterra, O., Lopes, A., Ragot, X. and Renaud, D., “Comment stabiliser la dette publique ?” [How to stabilise public debt?], Focus du Conseil d’analyse économique, no. 124, October 2025 (in French).
  • Checherita-Westphal, C. and Domingues Semeano, J., “Interest rate-growth differentials on government debt: an empirical investigation for the euro area”, ECB Working Paper Series, no. 2486, European Central Bank, November 2020.
  • Clavères, G., “Taux d’intérêt, croissance et soutenabilité de la dette publique” [Interest rates, growth and public debt sustainability], Trésor-Éco, no. 334, French Treasury, October 2023 (in French).
  • Cour des comptes, La situation et les perspectives des finances publiques [The state and outlook of public finances], June 2025, chapter III, pp. 79-126; June 2026, p. 46 (in French).
  • Ecalle, F., “Les finances publiques des pays de la zone euro de 2019 à 2025” [Public finances of euro-area countries from 2019 to 2025], Fipeco, commentary, April 2026 (in French).
  • Heimberger, P., “Public debt and r-g risks in advanced economies: Eurozone versus stand-alone”, Journal of International Money and Finance, vol. 136, article 102877, September 2023.
  • Heyer, É., Plane, M., Ragot, X., Sampognaro, R. and Timbeau, X., “Quelles trajectoires pour les finances publiques de la France ?” [What paths for France’s public finances?], Blog de l’OFCE, 2025 (in French).
  • French Treasury (Direction générale du Trésor), “Finances publiques: une situation dégradée, un redressement nécessaire” [Public finances: a deteriorated situation, a necessary recovery], Trésor-Éco, no. 403, September 2026 (in French).
  • Heyer, É., Plane, M., Ragot, X., Sampognaro, R. and Timbeau, X., “Quelles trajectoires pour les finances publiques de la France ?” [What paths for France’s public finances?], OFCE working paper no. 13, July 2025 (in French).
  • Lian, W., Presbitero, A. F. and Wiriadinata, U., “Public Debt and r - g at Risk”, IMF Working Paper, no. 20/137, International Monetary Fund, July 2020.

Literature review checked on 6 November 2026: each reference was read in the version indicated, in the sections on which what is said of it rests.

Summary

What to take away

The weight of a debt can fall without its amount decreasing: in Portugal, debt went from 235 to 275 billion euros in ten years while its weight fell from 131.0% to 89.2% of GDP.

Among EU countries whose debt started from a higher level than France’s, the ratio fell markedly in three of them: Cyprus, Portugal and Greece. The largest contribution there comes from interest and growth, about twice that of their primary surpluses. Their average implicit interest rate was not lower than France’s: their nominal growth was stronger. Slovenia, below the threshold used, reduced its ratio with a negative average primary balance, an average that does not rule out surpluses in some years.

In France, over the same decade, interest and growth took 15.0 points off the ratio, thanks to the years 2021-2023; primary deficits added 30.6, and the ratio rose by 18.7 points.

In 2025, the implicit interest rate and nominal growth were almost equal: the observed primary balance was 3.0 points of GDP, about 89 billion euros, below the marker that would have stabilised the ratio that year, excluding other adjustments. This marker changes every year with interest rates and growth; at this level of debt, one point of gap between interest rate and growth shifts it by about 1.1 points of GDP, in either direction.

None of the combinations observed is a transferable recipe: these comparisons say neither which policy would bring about a fall, nor at what price, nor who would pay it. That last point is the subject of Who really pays for public debt? What the balance, interest rates, growth or a change of rules would change here by 2035, and who would have to decide it, is the subject of Can the rules of the public debt game be changed?

Frequently asked questions

Are growth and inflation enough to bring debt down?

They lighten the ratio when nominal growth exceeds the interest rate paid on the debt, and their accounting contribution to the fall in the ratio is the largest in the three EU countries where it fell markedly, among those whose debt exceeded 90% of GDP at end-2015: about twice as much as their primary surpluses. But the effect varies a great deal from year to year: in France, it took off 16.8 points in 2021-2023 and accounted for +6.1 points in 2020. In this group, no country that stayed in average primary deficit saw its ratio fall by 15 points; Slovenia, below the threshold, did, with a primary balance in deficit on average, which does not rule out surpluses in some years.

Has France ever run a primary surplus?

Four times since 1996, from 1998 to 2001, at most 1.65% of GDP (Eurostat). Since then, the general government primary balance has been in deficit every year.

Is a primary surplus enough to bring the debt-to-GDP ratio down?

No. In 1998, France ran a primary surplus of 0.99% of GDP, above the balance that would have stabilised the ratio excluding adjustments (0.78%); the debt-to-GDP ratio nonetheless rose by 0.12 points. The stabilising balance already accounts for interest rates and growth: it was the other adjustments to the debt, outside the deficit, that pushed it up. In the ten-year windows of the 27 current EU members where starting debt exceeded 90% of GDP, the ratio fell by at least 15 points in none of the 35 windows with a negative average primary balance, in eight of the 30 with a balance from 0 to under 2%, in seven of the thirteen with a balance of at least 2%; these windows overlap and come from a few countries.

In the public debt dossier

To take the analysis further Dette Publique: Qui paie vraiment?, the author’s book, in French: contents, excerpts and reviews →

Where these figures come from

Eurostat, general government (S.13), ESA 2010 accounts, in national currency: Maastricht debt and nominal GDP as published with the deficit and debt notification (gov_10dd_edpt1), interest paid and net lending or borrowing (gov_10a_main, D41PAY and B9); GDP in volume (nama_10_gdp, chain-linked volumes), to split nominal growth into volume and prices. The primary balance is the general government balance plus interest paid. The identity is the one set out in Why does French public debt rise?; annual terms are cumulated over ten years, from the end of the year before the decade to the end of its last year. A year’s stabilising balance is that year’s interest-growth effect, excluding other adjustments. Changes and totals are computed before rounding: displayed figures may differ by 0.1 points.

Structural primary balance: European Commission, AMECO database, series UBLGBPS (general government balance excluding interest, adjusted for the cycle and one-off measures, in % of potential GDP), spring 2026 edition, an extract archived with its hash; it serves as a check and enters no calculation. The same applies to the two other checks on the structural ranking: OECD, Economic Outlook No. 119, series NLGXQU (underlying primary balance, excluding the cycle and one-off measures, in % of potential GDP, euro-area members that belong to the OECD); IMF, Fiscal Monitor, October 2026, series GGCBP_G01_PGDP_PT (cyclically adjusted primary balance only, in % of potential GDP).

Check: for each country and each year, the calculated debt ratio and primary balance are compared with those Eurostat publishes as a percentage of GDP, which the calculation does not use. Beyond a gap of 0.11 points, the year is excluded; a year for which Eurostat publishes no ratio cannot be checked and is excluded too. With the current accounts, five country-years out of 803 are excluded, all for lack of a published ratio (list and reason in the JSON file); for France and the compared countries, the script stops. A window containing a year of nominal growth above 35% is excluded: 18 are. The countries compared with France are designated by a rule, not chosen: debt above 90% of GDP at end-2015; the same calculation is redone at 80% and 100%. The figures computed from Eurostat series all come from the same script, which checks the main quantitative statements and stops if their conditions are no longer met; their wording is reviewed editorially. Figures attributed to the French Treasury, the Conseil d’analyse économique and the OFCE are given as they publish them.

Method shared by the debt pages: indicators and checks

The same word does not always name the same quantity from one page to the next. The table gives the key reference points; the section on where the figures come from, on each page, details its series and scopes.

IndicatorWhat it measuresWhere it is used
Maastricht debtgross consolidated debt of general government as a whole (central government, local authorities, social security), at nominal valuethe decompositions of the ratio (why it rises, can it come down); the rise in the debt (claims of the debate)
Negotiable debt of the French Statesecurities issued by the State alone (OATs and BTFs), managed by Agence France Trésorerosion by inflation, the holders of this debt and Banque de France purchases (inflation); the share held by non-residents, which the claims of the debate distinguish from that of general government as a whole
Debt-to-GDP ratioMaastricht debt divided by the year’s nominal GDPevery page; the inflation page explains why its result is not a change in this ratio
Primary balancegeneral government balance excluding interest, in the national accounts (interest payable, D.41)the decompositions of the ratio
Stabilising primary balancethe primary balance that would have left the ratio unchanged in the year, stock-flow adjustments asidecan it come down
Deficit that stabilises the ratiothe total deficit, interest included, that leaves the ratio unchanged for a given starting ratio and nominal growth, stock-flow adjustments asidethe examination of the claim that “a 3% deficit stabilises the debt” (claims of the debate): 3% is a deficit threshold, not a debt threshold
Implicit interest rategeneral government interest for the year (national accounts) divided by its Maastricht debt at the end of the previous yearwhy it rises, can it come down
Interest and debt chargedepending on the page: interest of general government as a whole, in the national accounts; the State’s debt charge (interest and indexation), in its budget; on the inflation page, the indexation cost of inflation-linked securities and the Banque de France’s exposure to rates. These measures cannot be added together.general government in the decompositions of the ratio; several scopes compared in the claims of the debate; inflation-linked securities and the Banque de France (inflation)

What is checked, and how. Three operations should be distinguished when reading the method of these pages.

  • Numerical checking. Depending on the page, figures are calculated by the script that writes the page, from published series, or taken from an archived calculation; this script checks the main numerical claims and stops if their conditions no longer hold. The decompositions of the ratio are also compared, year by year, with the ratio and the primary balance that Eurostat publishes, with the tolerance and exclusions each page states.
  • Documentary checking. Values taken from a document (Cour des comptes report, budget act, Banque de France or Agence France Trésor publication, study) are transcribed with the source the page cites; a study’s figures are reproduced as it publishes them, remain attributed to it and are kept apart from the recalculations made for these pages.
  • Editorial judgement. The choice of periods, presentation thresholds, comparisons and words is the author’s. Calculations check the consequences of these choices, not their relevance: they are reviewed, independent external reviews are reported where they are documented, and they are stated as such where they matter (a presentation threshold is not a result).

Reusing this page

The charts, the data and a ready-made citation, under an open licence. Each chart carries its source, period and reading caveat inside the image: reused in a lecture or an article, it is not separated from what makes it readable.

France: what pushed the weight of debt up or down, decade by decade

France: what pushed the weight of debt up or down, decade by decade

From one decade to the next, the term pushing French debt up changes; over the last one, interest and growth pulled it down and primary deficits pushed it up by more.

Reading caveat. An accounting decomposition, not a causal one: the three terms are not independent. Change computed on unrounded values; the sum of the contributions shown may differ by 0.1 points.

Eurostat gov_10dd_edpt1 (debt, GDP), gov_10a_main (B9, D41PAY), France, 1996-2025

Seven countries with debt above 90% of GDP at end-2015: what moved their ratio in ten years

Seven countries with debt above 90% of GDP at end-2015: what moved their ratio in ten years

Among countries that started from debt at least as high, the interest-growth effect pulled the ratio down everywhere; where the ratio fell markedly, it weighed about twice as much as primary surpluses.

Reading caveat. Greece, Cyprus and Portugal received official financing (2010-2018). An accounting comparison: it attributes the fall to no policy. Change computed on unrounded values; the sum of the contributions shown may differ by 0.1 points.

Eurostat gov_10dd_edpt1 (debt, GDP), gov_10a_main (B9, D41PAY), 2016-2025; countries sorted by change in the debt ratio

France: the observed primary balance and the one that would have stabilised the debt

France: the observed primary balance and the one that would have stabilised the debt

The primary balance that stabilises the debt changes every year with interest rates and growth; the observed balance mostly stayed below it.

Reading caveat. In % of GDP; stabilising balance = (implicit interest rate − nominal growth) / (1 + growth) × debt-to-GDP ratio at the end of the previous year, excluding other adjustments (stock-flow). An accounting marker for the year, not a target.

Eurostat gov_10dd_edpt1 (debt, GDP), gov_10a_main (B9, D41PAY), France, 1996-2025

Euro area, 2016-2025: France's interest rate, growth and primary balance

Euro area, 2016-2025: France’s interest rate, growth and primary balance

In the euro area, France pays one of the lowest implicit interest rates; what sets it apart is among the weakest nominal growth and the lowest primary balance.

Reading caveat. An accounting comparison: it says neither whether the gap comes from spending or revenue, nor which adjustment would be desirable. Implicit rate = interest paid / debt at the end of the previous year.

Eurostat gov_10dd_edpt1 (debt, GDP), gov_10a_main (B9, D41PAY), 2016-2025

Cite this page

Lalut, Stéphane (2026). “Can public debt come down?” Eurostat and European Commission (AMECO) data, retrieved 2 November 2026. https://stephane-lalut.com/en/can-public-debt-come-down/

In three sentences

From 2016 to 2025, primary deficits added 30.6 points of GDP to the French debt ratio, the interest-growth effect, concentrated in 2021-2023, took off 15.0, and other adjustments added 3.1: a rise of 18.7 points. Among the seven EU countries whose debt exceeded 90% of GDP at end-2015, the ratio fell markedly in three, first through the interest-growth effect, about twice as strong as that of their primary surpluses. This is an accounting decomposition, not a causal attribution.

The data

The decade-by-decade decomposition of the French debt-to-GDP ratio, the observed and stabilising primary balance (excluding other adjustments) year by year, the same decomposition for the EU countries whose debt exceeded 90% of GDP, and the averages for euro-area countries (primary balance, stabilising balance, implicit rate, nominal growth, AMECO structural balance); the same content exists as CSV, in long format.

Data and charts CC BY 4.0 — free reuse, including commercial, with attribution. Text under copyright — short quotations permitted, full reproduction on request. The raw series belong to their producers (Eurostat and European Commission [AMECO]), under their own terms.

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